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ABSTRACT
This study examines the topic of private equity, a subset of finance that deals with firms
that attempt to improve another company through a leveraged buyout or equity investment. The
goal of this paper is to understand whether private equity firms are helpful in the value creation of
their portfolio companies. Value creation refers to either operational improvements or financial
turnaround. Importantly, the focus of this study is from the perspective of portfolio companies
rather than the private equity firms. As a result, the study examines metrics such as return on net
operating assets (RNOA) to assess the operational health as well as Altman's Z-Score and Ohlson's
O-Score to assess the financial health of a portfolio company. The observations come from a
refined dataset of 35 portfolio companies, from immediately before the private equity buyout to
after the company goes public again through an initial public offering (IPO).
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INTRODUCTION
Overview of Private Equity
Private equity is a relatively new area within finance compared to traditional corporate
finance involving mergers and acquisitions, capital markets, or macroeconomics. Private equity,
or "PE" in short, can refer to an asset class or an investment strategy. Formally it is defined as a
majority ownership or minority stake within a non-publicly traded company by investors who are
also commonly private equity fund managers. Fund managers fundraise large amounts of capital
from institutional investors, including hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies,
university endowments, sovereign wealth funds, and wealthy individuals.
Private equity firms primarily generate value for their target investments, or companies, in
three ways. The first method is operational improvements. Operational improvements involve
providing strategic advice to the portfolio company, changing the company's management team,
or helping improve day-to-day operations. This could also entail assisting the target company in
coming up with new products to enhance revenue growth or cutting down on cost redundancies to
improve profitability. The second is financial engineering. This method involves tacking on a lot
of leverage initially and increasing the portion of equity over time while using excess cash to pay
down the debt. The last method used by private equity firms is multiple expansion, which deals
with selling the company at a higher multiple1 than what it was previously bought.
Typically, the investment horizon lasts from five to seven years before a private equity firm
decides to sell off its substantial equity stake in a company to either a strategic buyer or a financial
buyer. An example of a strategic buyer could be a large corporate firm that attains financial or
strategic synergies from the acquisition. On the other hand, a financial buyer is usually another

1

A typical multiple that is used is enterprise value over earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization (EBITDA), also known as EV over EBITDA.
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financial services firm, private equity shop, or hedge fund. The other common exit option for a
private equity target is an initial public offering, more commonly known as an IPO. This means
that the privately held firm is taken public again to be listed on the stock exchanges such as the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or Nasdaq, in the case of United States. There are various
stock markets respective to different countries across the world.
Private equity firms can employ one or several of many different strategies for their
investments based on a whole range of factors, including the age of the company, stage of the
company, size of the company, equity requirement, and macroeconomic conditions. One of these
strategies is leveraged buyouts, where a firm takes on a significant amount of borrowed capital
from institutional investors to pursue an acquisition. While leveraged buyouts are very prevalent
in private equity investing, other approaches include growth equity and distressed debt investing.
Some approaches may be more suitable than others depending on the situation and the nature of
the investment. For instance, during times of economic downturn, individuals will generally not
want to sell their companies to a private equity investor using a traditional leveraged buyout. This
is due to the undervaluation of their companies and an expectation that they can sell their firm at
a higher price once the market recovers. It may be very important for private equity investors to
increasingly familiarize themselves with non-traditional distressed debt investing techniques.

Research Question and Significance
The paper delves deeply into the topics of private equity and value creation. The different
sections of this paper strive to analyze whether true value creation by private equity firms could
exist for firms across all industries, and for both previously financially healthy and distressed
companies. In other words, the aim of this paper is to analyze whether private equity firms can
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successfully assist their targets in achieving both operational and financial improvements. The
research topic explored in this paper is two-fold. The first question is whether private equity firms
help or hurt their portfolio companies from achieving operational improvements. That is, the paper
investigates whether the company is able to do a better job at generate positive returns through its
operating activities due to the support of a private equity firm. The second question deals with
whether private equity firms assist with helping either reduce the risk of default for a more
distressed firm or improve the financial health for a firm at lower risk of default.
A better understanding of this topic has important implications for both academic
researchers who wish to learn more about the private equity space and practitioners who find a
passion for private equity. It strives to tackle the negative perception surrounding private equity
among many politicians and the overly skeptical general public. Critics of private equity contend
that private equity activity does not actually generate value for target firms and is only a means to
exacerbate the gap between the haves and have nots. However, it would be useful for researchers
to investigate the topic empirically to determine whether such claims are truly justified. It may be
perfectly possible for private equity to be a very effective means to assist their portfolio companies.
The paper also has important broader macroeconomic implications. Currently, much of the
arguments presented in debates surrounding the positive or negative impacts of private equity are
unwarranted with evidence. However, we know well that there would be a greater layer of
sophistication behind the effects of PE only by actually examining the dataset and what happened
in the real world.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Growth of Private Equity
Over the past several decades, an increasing number of institutional investors, including
mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies across the world, have allocated their
capital toward private equity firms. Private equity activity surged in the 1980s and 1990s with the
rise of mega-funds, including Kohlberg Kravis Partners (KKR) and Blackstone. Private equity
firms sought increasing media attention and gained popularity with the press in light of several
successful and iconic transactions. For instance, in 1988, KKR engaged in a $25 billion buyout of
RJR Nabisco, an American conglomerate of food and tobacco-related products (Cendrowski, Petro,
Martin, and Wadecki, 2012).
Since the 1990s, private equity activity only continued to grow and met its second buyout
wave, which lasted until about 2006. From 1980 to 2007, the amount of nominal dollars committed
to U.S. private equity funds have increased exponentially, from $0.2 billion to over $200 billion
(Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). According to the 2020 Preqin Pro Webinar, alternative assets under
management increased more than three-fold in the past decade, with private equity consistently
occupying the greatest proportion of allocated capital among the asset classes from 2006 to 2019.
Today, the total global amount of assets under management surpasses more than $5T (Preqin
Quarterly Update: Private Equity & Venture Capital, 2021).

Pros and Cons of Private Equity
There has been much academic research done on the operational effects of private equity
activity on companies in general. On the one hand, proponents of private equity have identified
the benefits of high leverage, concentrated ownership, and careful monitoring by private equity
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investors toward their target companies. A large body of research on the positive effects of private
equity firms has been motivated by Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis. Jensen argues that
leveraged buyouts better align managerial incentives with private equity shareholders compared
to diverse public ownership, by "forcing the release of excess cash flow on a frequent basis"
(Jensen, 1986).
However, some other scholars and politicians suggest that private equity activity merely
transfers value across stakeholders and taxpayers rather than generates value. Kaplan and Stein
(1993) have for long argued how excessive leverage translates into greater risk and default of
companies during times of booming credit markets, rather exacerbating the financial situation of
companies in near distress.
More recent studies have also attempted to undermine the true efficacy of private equity
firms in generating operational value. For instance, based on an analysis of 183 hand-collected
statements of U.S. public-to-private LBO transactions, Ayah and Schütt (2016) claim that there
may have been an accounting distortion that creates a false perception of value generation. In
reality, however, the scholars suggest that there is no significant evidence of post-buyout
improvements, regardless of the time period.

Investing in Distressed Debt Markets
A relatively underexplored, but increasingly growing sector of investing has been within
the distressed debt markets, where private equity firms and hedge funds continue to find more
opportunities. Until the 1980s, the concept of distressed debt was not nearly as prevalent, with
many "Fallen Angels", or companies whose ability to pay back equity had fallen, resorting to
Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy rather than restructuring. However, with the increasingly flexible
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regulations on high-yield junk bonds, there was a greater likelihood for turnaround rather than
liquidation (DePonte, 2010).
In the late cycle credit market that faces the twenty-first century, the distressed investing
space will become increasingly relevant and imperative for private equity firms to distinguish
themselves from competitors. The goal of private equity firms would be to identify target
companies in distress and establish control positions cheaply in order to restructure the companies
before their expected bankruptcy. Many specialized opportunistic real estate funds such as
Cerberus and Lone Star have started to gain popularity for their expertise on distressed transactions
(DePonte, 2010).

Financially Distressed Companies
In theory, no company is completely free from the influence of financial distress. Either
due to the harsh industry or macroeconomic conditions or poor operations during certain years,
some public companies may have to go through the painful process of overcoming distress to avoid
financial defaults (Song and Lewison, 2018). Additionally, it is possible for a company to go
private voluntarily or involuntarily, where in the latter case the stock exchange forcefully delists a
company when it doesn't meet the bare requirements to stay public.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, many firms have experienced
financial distress in the form of bankruptcy. The singular defining moment in the crisis that is still
referred to today, for instance, is the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. During times of economic
crisis, financial firms rely heavily on short-term liabilities and lending is very difficult to obtain,
leaving few alternative options for the distressed firm (Ayotte and Skeel Jr, 2009).
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Effects of Private Equity Firms on Financially Distressed Firms
One alternative option to bankruptcy for a financially distressed company is to actively
search for a buyer of its outstanding shares, where the buyer is either a private equity firm or
another financial services firm. These buyers are also known as bidders. Whether the sale of a
financially distressed firm is beneficial to turnaround and operational improvements is highly
debatable, although there might be a clear incentive for both parties to engage in the transaction.
For private equity buyers in particular that specialize in distressed equity buyouts, such takeovers
allow for the effective redeployment of assets (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998). This is especially
the case given that private equity practitioners may have extensive experience dealing with a
financial reorganization. As for the distressed targets, the clear incentive to selling themselves to
a bidder would be to avoid the potentially worse alternative of entering bankruptcy (Hambrick and
D'Aveni, 1988).
Scholars from previous literature have mixed opinions on the effects of private equity firms
on the future success of their distressed companies in achieving turnaround and operational
improvements. As for achieving turnaround, the primary consideration for private equity firms is
the extent to which acquiring a distressed target in their portfolio would raise the risk of themselves
defaulting. For operational improvements, the important questions would revolve around whether
acquiring a financially distressed target would allow for more opportunities to expand its products
or geographies, allowing for a greater return of the private equity firm and higher profitability for
the target company in the long-term.

9

Role of PE Firms: Potential for Turnaround
On the one hand, prior research suggests that going into the hands of the private equity firm
would imply a lower risk for the target company due to diversification effects, as can be seen with
traditional mergers and acquisitions (Amihud and Lev, 1981). That is, having various firms of
different industries and capital structure in a given private equity portfolio during the holding
period would mean that there is more opportunity for the PE firm to share the financial risk of a
given target firm with another portfolio company. Some other papers provide deeper insight into
other ways that private equity firms can reduce the risk pertaining to distressed target companies.
Upon extensive analysis of more than 2,156 firms, one study claims that private-equity firms are
more likely to restructure out of court and absolve themselves of near bankruptcy situations
(Hotchkiss, Strömberg, and Smith, 2014).
On the other hand, there is an argument for why there are greater risk effects associated
with private equity firms acquiring financially distressed firms. There is potential for an acquirer
to fail at successfully restructuring a target firm, meaning that the acquirer is not able to generate
excess returns both at the announcement of the deal and in the long-term (Clark and Ofek, 1994).
The reason for this is that there is a greater bidder default risk that arises due to an increase in postacquisition leverage and aggressive and risky managerial decisions (Bruyland and De Maeseneire,
2016). Such financial risks may serve to not only offset the diversification risk that is mentioned
above but also increases the probability of the target firm entering financial default. Therefore, it
seems important to weigh the impacts of diversification and leverage risk on a case-by-case basis,
based on the private equity firm's style of investing and the nature of its portfolio. In doing so,
private equity investors may come to an informed determination of whether they can avoid
bankruptcy and engage in a potential financial turnaround.
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Role of PE Firms: Potential for Operational Improvements
As mentioned earlier, one of the key roles of private equity firms is to engage in operational
improvements of their target companies, which contributes to an increased internal rate of return.
Acquisitions of distressed firms may allow for buyers to achieve financial or strategic synergies
with other firms in their portfolio and introduce attractive opportunities to expand geographically
or augment market share (Peel and Wilson, 1989). As well, private equity practitioners may bring
their specialized knowledge on industry trends and competitors as well as extensive deal and
managerial experience, which could serve helpful in generating tangible improvements for their
target companies.
However, the fundamental question is whether such potential for operational
improvements may be offset by financial and leverage risks. It is also possible that the private
equity firm may be motivated by solely improving the internal rate of return, while there may be
different strategic objectives that the target would have hoped to achieve, leading to misaligned
incentives. These are areas that are yet to be explored in much depth empirically within the
distressed debt investing space but would definitely be interesting to observe more deeply.
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DATA AND METHODS
The two primary databases that I have relied on for data collection are Preqin Pro and
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Both of these sources were useful in effectively
aggregating data that would have otherwise had to be manually collected through skimming the
publicly available filings, such as the 10-K or 10-Q. The goal of this data collection process was
to find a sizable list of companies that have been taken from publicly to privately listed through a
private equity backed buyout transaction and later taken public through an initial public offering
("IPO") after the private equity firm has exited the investment. Given that we were looking for
companies that were already public before the buyout, as well as the availability of other exit
options apart from IPO, such as a sale to a financial buyer or strategic buyer, I did not expect my
dataset to be large. However, my hope going into this process was to at least have a reasonably
decent number of observations to draw some statistically significant results.

Preqin Pro
Preqin Pro separated its data on companies and deals under various categories including
"deal search" and "exits search". Deal search provided information such as the deal date, deal status,
investment type, investors, primary industry, industry verticals, and deal size. On the other hand,
"exits search" provided information such as the exit date, exit type, and exit value. To develop a
comprehensive dataset, I collected data using each of these features separately and applied the
VLOOKUP function on Excel to later merge these two datasets based on the overlapping portfolio
companies.
From the 96,654 results that were initially provided under the "deal search" for buyouts, I
was able to narrow the number of observations to only 485 results by filtering across deal date
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(01/01/2000 - 01/01/2016), deal location (US), investment type (public to private), and deal status
(completed). Then, from the 45,966 results that were initially provided under the "exits search" for
buyouts, I was able to narrow the number of observations to only 812 results by filtering across
exit date (01/01/2000 - 01/01/2021), deal location (US), exit type (IPO). As part of the final step
outlined above, I merged these two datasets into one Excel tab using the VLOOKUP function to
attain 70 total US-based observations that have all been taken from public to private and brought
back to the public market via an IPO upon the private equity firm/s exiting the investment.

Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS)
From merging two datasets to form one unified and cleaned dataset from Preqin Pro, I now
had access to important information on the deal date, investors, primary industry, industry verticals,
deal size, exit date, exit type, and exit value. To examine the pre-buyout or post-IPO distress
situation of the portfolio company, I now needed financial data of the 70 portfolio companies. To
collect information on current assets, total assets, current liabilities, total liabilities, working capital,
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), net income (loss), retained earnings, total revenue,
stockholder's equity, and total market value of equity, I relied on Wharton Research Data Services.
On WRDS, under Get Data > Compustat - Capital IQ > North America - Annual Updates >
Fundamentals Annual, I selected the date range as "1999-01" to "2019-07" in order to match the
relevant data range for the 70 observations found on Preqin Pro. The next step was to insert the
relevant tickers for each of the 70 firms. This process was slightly tricky because one company
could have been listed under two different tickers pre-buyout and post-IPO. As a result, I needed
to use the "Code Lookup" option to carefully and manually select the one or two tickers for each
company to extract the necessary financial data. For instance, Aeroflex Inc. (one of the 70
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observations) was listed as "ARXX" during the pre-buyout years and "ARX" during the post-IPO
years. Often times, the ticker did not appear to sound related to the name of the company such as
for Sabre Holdings, whose pre-buyout ticker was "TSG.2" and Intrawest Resorts, whose post-IPO
ticker was "SNOW".
Once engaging in this process of finding the right tickers and throwing out the observations
that were either missing a ticker or had an incomplete pair of financial data for both pre-buyout
and post-IPO, the number of observations were reduced from 70 to 40. As the last step of the data
extraction process, I selected the relevant query variables mentioned above and output format as
Excel spreadsheet. Once having gone through this process, I had to eliminate five more
observations (Envision Healthcare Holdings, RailAmerica, Inc., Express, Inc., Hertz Global
Holdings, and First Data Corporation) due to incomplete information on important financial
variables that would later be important in calculating the Altman's Z-Score and Ohlson's O-Score.
For the purposes of corroborating our thesis, the dates that would be most useful to look at
within our data of fiscal years that ranged from anywhere between 1999-01 to 2019-07 were the
data pertaining to the latest fiscal year before the pre-buyout and the earliest fiscal year after the
post-IPO. In other words, each of the 40 portfolio companies would have two pairs of financial
data, leading to approximately 80 unique rows on the Excel tab for financial data.

Exploring the Dataset
For improved audience understanding, I now engage in exploratory data analysis for the
35 portfolio companies. This process entails summarizing various details that were initially
compiled from Wharton Research Data Services, including entry year, exit year, duration of
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investment (# years), deal size, primary industry, sub-industry classification, and the investors or
buyers that were involved in the deal.

Figure 1: Frequencies by Entry Year and Exit Year
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The two graphs above illustrate when deals have most frequently been entered and exited
by private equity for the sample of 35 portfolio companies that my study focuses on. Deals within
my sample have most frequently been entered in 2006 and 2007 (18 out of 35 deals for two years
combined) with the most frequent year being 2006 (12 out of 35 deals). Deals have most frequently
been exited in 2013 (6 out of 35 deals) followed by in 2011 (5 out of 35 deals). In other words,
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many of the deals in my sample were entered before the global financial crisis took place and
exited once the crisis was over by one or two years.

Figure 2: Duration of Investment by Private Equity Firm

For each of the 35 observations, the above graph shows the duration of investment in terms
of the number of years. The average number of years that a portfolio company was held by private
equity was approximately five years. The firm that was held the longest number of years was
Ceridian Corporation (observation #12), an information technology and software company that
was held for 10.9 years by private equity firms Thomas H Lee, Blum Capital Partners, Ridgemont
Equity Partners, North Sea Capital, and Fidelity National Financial, Inc. Meanwhile, the firm that
was held the shortest number of years was VCA Inc. (observation #13), a healthcare firm that was
only held for just a little over eight months by Leonard Green & Partners.
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Figure 3: Deal Size in USD millions

Next, the average deal size for the 35 portfolio companies was approximately 7.03B, with
some of the largest deals in my sample being HCA, Inc. (observation #11) at ~$33B, followed by
Caesars Entertainment Corporation (observation #10) at ~$30B, Hilton Worldwide Holdings
(observation #3) at ~$26B, and Kinder Morgan Inc. (observation #4) at ~$22.4B. The smaller deals
within my sample generally spanned from anywhere between the $25M to $500M range in terms
of transaction size. Finally, there seemed to be two deals, buyout of Laureate Education, Inc.
(observation #14) and Metals USA, Inc. (observation #21) that had undisclosed deal values from
WRDS but was approximately $4.6B and $1.2B, respectively, when searched for separately online.
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Figure 4: Deals by Primary Industry and Sub-Industry

Another part of the exploratory data analysis that the audience may be curious to know is
the industry representation across the 35 portfolio companies that my paper examines. I was able
to find that out of the 35 observations, 10 of them belonged to the consumer discretionary sector,
specifically within sub-industries such as retail (3 deals), travel & leisure (3 deals), education /
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training (3 deals), and consumer products (1 deal). Following that, the primary industry that was
represented the second most frequently was information technology, with seven observations,
across various sub-industries including semiconductors, software, and IT infrastructure.

The Extent of Operational Improvements Pre-Buyout and Post-IPO
One of the fundamental questions that is explored within my paper is the extent of value
creation coming from operational improvements. The thesis presented in this paper only delves
more deeply into the change in operational improvements and financial engineering during the
private equity ownership period, and less so on multiple expansion, because we are more interested
to learn about the positive or negative impact on the portfolio company, rather than the returns
generated for the private equity firm itself.
While some common metrics that are used to assess the profitability of a firm include return
on assets, return on invested capital, and return on equity, I instead decide to use the return on net
operating assets (RNOA) as my ultimate metric to assess the extent of operational value created
for the private equity firm. Measures such as return on assets lack the ability to effectively
differentiate between operating and financial activities by including financial assets and excluding
operating liabilities in its base (Nissim and Penman, 2001). As a result, I instead rely on RNOA,
which is a measure that emphasizes that operating liabilities reduce the net operating assets that
are used by a firm, more properly reflecting the extent of operating income generated by operating
activities.
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Calculating Return on Net Operating Assets
Return on net operating assets (RNOA) is calculated by dividing the operating income by
the net operating assets. Operating income is calculated by summing up the comprehensive net
income and net financial expense (NFE), where NFE = (Financial Expense - Financial Income),
after tax. This information is also readily available on the WRDS database. Net operating assets is
calculated by taking operating assets (OA) - operating liabilities (OL), where operating assets
include balance sheet items like cash, prepaid expenses, accounts receivable, inventory, and fixed
assets, whereas operating liabilities include accounts payable, wages payable, pension liabilities,
and deferred tax liabilities.

Table 1: Return on Net Operating Assets and Change in RNOA for Pre-Buyout and Post-IPO
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The table above illustrates the change in net operating assets for a subsample of 18 out of
35 companies based on the data that was available on WRDS for the various components that go
into the calculation of RNOA. I was able to find that 11 out of 18 companies demonstrated a
positive change in return on net operating assets from before the buyout by the private equity firm
to after the firm was listed publicly again via an IPO. On the other hand, seven out of 18 companies
have shown a negative change in RNOA from before and after the buyout and IPO, respectively.

Table 2: Return on Net Operating Assets Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Buyout and Post-IPO

Further, the table above illustrates that the average RNOA for the subsample of 18 firms
has increased very slightly by 2%, from 29% to 31% from before the buyout to after the IPO has
occurred. Across all quartiles, the numbers have marginally increased across the board, meaning
that on aggregate, it seems plausible to believe that private equity firms have contributed positively
to assisting firms with generating returns from their operating activities, which I used as the proxy
for extent of operational improvements in my research paper.

Altman's Z-Score and Ohlson's O-Score to Measure Distress
In order to both measure the financial distress of a portfolio company and hopefully
compare the distress situation for the firm upon the influence of private equity buyout, I computed
the Altman's Z-Score and Ohlson's O-Score for each company both before the buyout and after the
IPO. While the Altman's Z-Score and Ohlson's O-Score are both empirical models that aim to
predict the likelihood of corporate bankruptcy using financial information, one difference between
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the two methods is that the Altman's Z-Score is benchmarked against other companies in Altman's
study to assess more generally whether a firm is financially sound or likely to go bankrupt, whereas
the Ohlson's O-Score is converted into an exact and precise probability of default.

Altman's Z-Score
The Altman's Z-Score was first published in 1968 by Edward Altman, whose dataset
initially examined 66 publicly traded manufacturing companies, half of which had declared
bankruptcy and half of which had not declared bankruptcy. Altman collected financial information
from annual filings and combined various ratios into a linear equation to arrive at the Z-Score,
which would predict corporate failure. Altman published variations of his initial Z-Score used just
for manufacturing firms to come up with a more general form of the Z-Score that could be more
broadly applied to all publicly held companies.
The general Altman's Z-Score is calculated using the formula, Z = 6.56 * X1 + 3.26 * X2 +
6.72 * X3 + 1.05 * X4, where X1 = working capital over total assets (a ratio that measures firm
liquidity), X2 = retained earnings / total assets, X3 = earnings before interest and taxes (also referred
to as "EBIT") / total assets, and X4 = book value of stockholder's equity / total liabilities. According
to Invest Excel website, if the calculated Altman's Z-Score, which is denoted by "Z" in the equation
above, is greater than 2.6, the firm is deemed to be financially sound, whereas if the Z-Score is
less than 1.1, then the firm has a high likelihood of bankruptcy.

Ohlson's O-Score
The Ohlson's O-Score was a model that was developed and introduced in 1980 by James
Ohlson in the Journal of Accounting. While the objective of the Ohlson's O-Score is to also
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measure the distress risk of firms, this linear factor model incorporates a different set of financial
ratios in the calculation of the O-Score, including both continuous and categorical variables. The
formula for Ohlson's O-Score is T = -1.32 - 0.407 * log(TAt / GNP) + 6.03 * (TLt / TAt) - 1.43 *
(WCt / TAt) + 0.0757 * (CLt / CAt) - 1.72 * X - 2.37 * (NIt / TAt) - 1.83 * (FFOt / TLt) + 0.285 * Y
- 0.521 * (NIt - NIt-1) / (|NIt| + |NIt-1|), where TA = total assets, GNP = gross national product price
index level, TL = total liabilities, WC = working capital, CL = current liabilities, CA = current
assets, X = 1 if TL exceeds TA and 0 otherwise (categorical variable), NI = net income, FFO =
funds from operations, and Y = 1 if a net loss for the last two years and 0 otherwise (categorical
variable).
Upon calculating the O-Score, which is denoted by "T" in the equation above, converting
the O-Score into a probability of default can be done by applying the formula of P(Failure) = eOScore

/ (1 + eO-Score). As the numerator is less than the denominator, the equation above will always

be less than 1. A more negative or smaller number for the O-Score would cause the probability of
failure to converge towards 0%, whereas a more positive or larger number for the O-Score would
cause the probability of failure to converge towards 100%.

Results and Findings
In order to examine the financial distress as a potential result of portfolio company
ownership under a private equity firm, I examined the Altman's Z-Score and Ohlson's Z-Score for
firms pre-buyout and post-IPO, the change in Altman's Z-Score and Ohlson's O-Score (delta
expressed in numerical terms), and the change in the likelihood of bankruptcy or default using
Altman's cutoffs and Ohlson's probability of default.
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Altman's Z-Score
The table below illustrates the descriptive statistics including minimum, first quartile,
median, third quartile, maximum, and average values of the 35 portfolio companies for Altman's
Z-Score for both pre-buyout and post-IPO.

Table 3: Altman's Z-Score Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Buyout and Post-IPO

As shown from the above, the average Altman's Z-Score has gone from 2.78 before the
buyout to 0.34 after the IPO. Comparing it to Invest Excel's cutoffs, 2.78 is a number that is above
2.6, which is the minimum number and cutoff at which firms would be classified as financially
sound. However, 0.34 is a number that is below 1.1, which is the maximum number and cutoff at
which firms would be classified as having a high likelihood of bankruptcy. This means that on
average, the same companies before the private equity buyout were more financially sound
compared to after they were taken public again following the private equity investment, when they
were at greater risk of bankruptcy.
This steep drop from 2.78 to 0.34 in the average Altman's Z-Score seems to be coming
from a decrease in all four of the components that go into calculating Altman's Z-Score. These
components include working capital / total assets (0.15 pre-buyout to 0.08 post-IPO), retained
earnings / total assets (-0.04 pre-buyout to -0.33 post-IPO), EBIT / total assets (0.09 pre-buyout to
0.08 post-IPO), and book value of equity / total liabilities (1.25 pre-buyout to 0.37 post-IPO).
Please refer to Appendices 1~4 for further details on the distribution of variables that are affecting
the Altman's Z-Score.
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Ohlson's O-Score
The table below illustrates the descriptive statistics including minimum, first quartile,
median, third quartile, maximum, and average values of the 35 portfolio companies for Ohlson's
O-Score for both pre-buyout and post-IPO.

Table 4: Ohlson's O-Score Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Buyout and Post-IPO

As shown from above, the average Ohlson's O-Score has gone from 1.06 before the buyout
to 2.93 after the IPO. A higher number for Ohlson's O-Score is associated with a higher probability
of failure or bankruptcy. This implies that on average, the same companies before the private
equity buyout had a lower probability of bankruptcy compared to after they were taken public
following the private equity investment, when they had a higher probability of bankruptcy. These
results are consistent with what we had found by analyzing the descriptive statistics for the
Altman's Z-Score.

Change in Altman's Z-Score and Ohlson's O-Score
The average change, or delta, in Altman's Z-Score for all 35 firms is equal to -2.44, whereas
the average change, or delta, in Ohlson's O-Score for all 35 firms is equal to 1.87. The difference
between these average numbers and the average mentioned in the tables above is that these
averages are the average Altman's Z-Score or average Ohlson's O-Score of the differences for each
pair of portfolio company's pre-buyout and post-IPO. There is an important distinction here, but
in any case, the conclusion seems to be consistent that, on average, firms are at greater risk of
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bankruptcy after they are taken public again after the private equity investment compared to before
the buyout took place.

Changes in Likelihood of Bankruptcy or Default
Altman's cutoffs of 2.6 and 1.1 are the lowest number for which a firm would be classified
as financially sound and the highest number for which a firm would be classified as having high
likelihood of bankruptcy, respectively. I have classified everything between 1.1 and 2.6 as
"indeterminate", which represents a more moderate outcome for a firm's likelihood to enter
financial distress.

Table 5: Change in Financial Health for Pre-Buyout and Post IPO Based on Altman's Metrics

A very interesting result from the table above is that out of the 35 portfolio companies that
we have calculated Altman's Z-Score for, we have seen that a private equity buyout has actually
been associated with a negative impact in terms of financial health of a company. A total of 17 out
of 35, which is almost half of the companies, have been downgraded from either "indeterminate"
or "financially sound" status to "bankruptcy likely". Another six firms have been downgraded from
"financially sound" to "indeterminate". On the other hand, rarely was a private equity buyout
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associated with a positive improvement in the financial health of the company. Only one out of 35
firms has gone from a "bankruptcy likely" to "indeterminate" status from before the buyout to after
the IPO, based on Altman's Z-Score.

FURTHER DISCUSSION
Two potential limitations that the research methodology may experience include the lack
of observations within the sample and the lack of control for variables outside of the study. One
example of a variable that could have been controlled for includes macroeconomic conditions that
could have affected the performance of firms during certain years compared to others. These two
limitations could raise potential concerns of external validity and establishment of causality of
private equity firms really being the ones to drive the results in operational improvements or
affecting the likelihood of bankruptcy. In order to rectify these limitations as potential areas of
improvement, I definitely see myself potentially incorporating more variables as provided by the
public filings such as the financial statements to manually collect more data on the various buyouts
that were excluded or eliminated as observations due to lack of financial information.
Another interesting extension to this study as a potential next step would be to assess
whether private equity activity is beneficial for portfolio companies compared to when there is no
private equity activity by examining comparable firms. In order to juxtapose these two cases as
effectively as possible, I would be identifying anywhere from three to five firms that would most
accurately serve as comparables for each of the 35 portfolio companies that were used already in
my paper. The extension study would engage in an extensive matching process of firms based on
various criteria including market capitalization, industry, geography, and the vintage year of the
investment. The comparable firms will not be taken private and continuously held public, and I
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would ultimately be looking at metrics like internal rate of return (IRR) for my portfolio company
and comparing that against the comparable firm's return on equity.

CONCLUSION
My paper has strived to explore the influence that private equity firms have on their target
portfolio companies. While there is much public discourse on the positive or negative impact that
private equity has on the firms that they invest in, there seems to still be a limited body of academic
literature exploring the subject. As a result, my study has examined changes in both the extent of
operational improvements and risk of financial bankruptcy before the private equity buyout and
post the initial public offering (IPO) for 35 portfolio companies over the course of 2000 to 2019,
in an attempt to assess the value created by private equity firms.
The results show that from a standpoint of financial health, the 35 firms have tended to
generally experience a greater risk of default after the post-IPO phase compared to before the
buyout occurred, both from a standpoint of Altman's Z-Score and Ohlson's O-Score, two widely
metrics used by academic scholars to assess the financial health of a firm. On the other hand, an
analysis of a subsample of 18 out of 35 firms has revealed that their return on net operating assets
has, on average, improved from before the buyout occurred to after the IPO. As a result, I was able
to find that despite private equity firms tacking higher levels of debt on their investments, PE firms
may also contribute to operational improvements by helping portfolio companies generating higher
returns from improved operating activities.
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Working Capital / Total Assets Comparison for Portfolio Companies Pre-Buyout
and Post-IPO

Appendix 2: Retained Earnings / Total Assets Comparison for Portfolio Companies Pre-Buyout
and Post-IPO
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Appendix 3: EBIT / Total Assets Comparison for Portfolio Companies Pre-Buyout and Post-IPO

Appendix 4: Book Value of Equity / Total Liabilities for Portfolio Companies Pre-Buyout and
Post-IPO

32

33

